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The Elements of Well-Being
Brad HookEr
University of Reading
aBsTracT
This essay contends that the constitutive elements of well-being are plural, partly 
objective, and separable. The essay argues that these elements are pleasure, friend-
ship, significant achievement, important knowledge, and autonomy, but not either 
the appreciation of beauty or the living of a morally good life. The essay goes on to 
attack the view that elements of well-being must be combined in order for well-being 
to be enhanced. The final section argues against the view that, because anything im-
portant to say about well-being could be reduced to assertions about these separable 
elements, the concept of well-being or personal good is ultimately unimportant.
clarificaTions
like most philosophers, i will take the term ‘well-being’ to be synonymous with 
‘welfare’, ‘personal good’, and ‘individual utility’. contributions to well-being i refer 
to as benefits or gains. subtractions from well-being i refer to as harms, losses, or 
costs. The elements of well-being are whatever constitutes benefits, that is, contribu-
tions to well-being.
absolutely essential is the distinction between non-instrumental value, which is 
sometimes called final value, and instrumental value. Examples of things with merely 
instrumental value are money, medicine, and sleep. This paper focuses on non-in-
strumental value. When i refer to contributions to well-being, i mean non-instrumen-
tal contributions, that is, things that are good for us in their own right as opposed to 
good only because they are means to other things. The main focus of the paper is on 
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the question of what constitutes non-instrumental contributions to a person’s well-
being. definitely, all of the values i will be discussing do have instrumental value. But 
i will be focusing on these values not for their instrumental benefits but as putative 
elements of well-being.
HEdonism
Hedonism is the theory that well-being consists in pleasures minus pains. 
Pleasures are experiences found attractive solely because of their experiential quality, 
rather than for other reasons. Pains are experiences found aversive solely because of 
their experiential quality, rather than for other reasons.1
The focus on experiential quality brings out a defining feature of pleasures and 
pains, namely that they are introspectively discernible (which is not to say that they are 
actually discerned). imagine someone who fails in the central project of her life but 
never finds out about this failure. an example might be the amateur sleuth who spent 
the last five years of her life trying to discover how and why the child madeleine 
mccann disappeared. The sleuth died thinking that she had made the crucial discov-
ery that solved the case. But in fact her ‘discovery’ turned out to be quite mistaken. 
Because she didn’t find out that she failed, her pleasures were what they would have 
been had her project instead been a success. Hedonists hold that the failure of a life 
project does not, in itself, reduce the person’s welfare. Hedonists think that a per-
son’s welfare is determined solely by how this person’s life feels from the inside. How 
her life feels from the inside may depend in part on whether she believes her desires 
have been fulfilled. How her life feels from the inside does not necessarily depend on 
whether her desires really have been fulfilled. (for recent defences of hedonism, see 
feldman, 2004, and crisp, 2006, ch. 4.)
i have contended that introspective discernibility is essential to pleasure and 
that success in one’s projects is not. This is true whether the project is relatively dis-
crete, such as finding out how and why a small child suddenly disappeared, or much 
more complex and general, such as the goals of having lots of good friends and of 
being knowledgeable about science, history, and metaphysics and of creating things 
of enduring value. consider someone who believes that he has enough good friends 
and that he is knowledgeable about science, history, and metaphysics and that he has 
1. Here i am especially grateful to anonymous reviewers for wording.
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created things of enduring value. This person is likely to feel some satisfaction with 
his life.
Perhaps this sort of satisfaction is the most important kind of pleasure (sumner, 
1996, ch. 6). nevertheless, getting this kind of pleasure is possible even if one is 
deluded about whether one’s desires for good friends, for knowledge of science, 
history, and metaphysics, and for creative success have actually been fulfilled. feeling 
satisfied with one’s life is compatible with delusion about pretty much everything 
except whether one feels satisfied with one’s life.
dEsirE-fulfilmEnT
another main view of welfare holds that a person’s well-being is constituted by 
the fulfilment of his or her desires, whether or not the person knows the desires have 
been fulfilled. This view is often called the desire-fulfilment (or preference-satisfac-
tion) theory of well-being.
The main argument in favour of the desire-fulfilment theory over hedonism 
is that many people’s self-interested concern extends beyond their own pleasures 
and pains, enjoyments and frustrations (nozick, 1974, esp. p. 43). for example, many 
people have stronger self-interested concern for knowing the truth (especially about 
whether their other desires are fulfilled) than for blissful ignorance.
The main argument against the desire-fulfilment theory is that some desires are 
so wacky that their fulfilment would not itself constitute a benefit for the people who 
have them (even if whatever associated pleasure these people derived from believing 
their desires were fulfilled would constitute a benefit for them). imagine someone who 
wants a saucer of mud, or to count all the blades of grass in the lawns along a street, 
or to turn on as many radios as possible (anscombe, 1958, p. 70; rawls, 1971, p. 432; 
Quinn 1993, p. 236). suppose this person wants these things for their own sakes, i.e., 
non-instrumentally. fulfilment of such desires in itself would not be of any benefit to 
this person, we intuitively think.
oBjEcTivE lisT THEory
a third theory of welfare agrees with hedonism that pleasure constitutes 
a benefit. Where this third theory departs from hedonism is over the question of 
whether there is only one element of well-being or more than one. The third theory 
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claims that other things can also constitute benefits—for example, knowledge of 
important matters, friendship, significant achievement, and autonomy. derek Parfit 
(1984, pp. 493–502) dubbed this theory the ‘objective list theory’, but often the name 
is shortened to the ‘list theory’. according to this objective list theory, a life contains 
more welfare to the extent that it contains pleasure, knowledge of important matters, 
friendship, significant achievement, and autonomy. a life full of pleasure and fulfil-
ment of desires for things other than the goods just listed could still be of low quality 
precisely because it lacked the goods just listed. (for discussion, see Griffin, 1986, pp. 
29–35, 58–72; crisp, 1997, ch. 3.)
What makes one achievement more significant than another? Thomas Hurka 
(1993, chs. 8–10; 2011, ch. 5) argues persuasively that extended and difficult achieve-
ments are more significant than narrow and easy ones. admittedly, a narrower and 
less difficult achievement might benefit you more than one that is more extended and 
difficult, because the narrower one brings you greater pleasure or because it helps 
develop your friendships or because you learn more from it. in other words, when 
instrumental as well as intrinsic value is considered, a narrower and less difficult 
achievement can be on balance more beneficial to you than a wider and more diffi-
cult achievement. But when we ignore the instrumental benefits of different achieve-
ments, we should conclude that extended and difficult achievements are more signifi-
cant than narrow and easy ones.
We might likewise follow Hurka (1993, chs. 8–10; 2011, ch. 4) in holding that ex-
tended and explanatory knowledge is better than narrow and shallow knowledge. for 
example, knowledge of the basic truths of physics or biology or metaphysics is more 
important than knowledge of the batting averages achieved by the middle-ranking 
players on a particular team in a particular month thirty-three years ago. But knowl-
edge about yourself or things closely connected to you can sometimes constitute a 
larger benefit to you than would more general knowledge about things with no special 
connection to you. knowing important facts about yourself—having self-knowl-
edge—is a more important element of your well-being than knowing general truths 
about physics or biology or metaphysics or other people. for example, knowing your 
own failings is more important than knowing other people’s failings. on the other 
hand, knowing that something is true not only of you but also of everyone else would 
constitute a larger benefit than knowing merely the truth about yourself.
Even more contestable than which kind of achievement or knowledge is most 
valuable as an element of well-being is the question of exactly what comprises auton-
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omy. does autonomy consist merely in having one’s actions be guided by desires that 
one desires to have? or does autonomy consist in having one’s decisions be guided by 
one’s own value judgements? or does autonomy require that one’s value judgements 
be themselves autonomously produced? or does autonomy require that one’s value 
judgements be at least minimally sensible?
These questions are fascinating but, alas, too difficult to address here. Hence, 
i must simply assume an answer. This is that someone’s life contains autonomy to 
the extent to which she has a variety of important options to choose among, her 
choices reflect her value judgements, and her value judgements are at least minimally 
reflective (i.e., she has at least once considered them rather than merely always ac-
cepted them without consideration). if jack severely constricted jill’s set of impor-
tant options, or if he controlled her choices by controlling her value judgements, she 
would lack autonomy. The same would be true if a brain injury or mental illness con-
trolled her value judgements or prevented her from being able to assess them.
now, how can we ascertain whether any given putative good is an item on the 
objective list? We must run the following kind of thought experiment. We imagine 
two possible lives for someone that are as much alike as possible except that one of 
these lives contains more of some candidate good than the other. We then think 
about whether the life containing more of the candidate good would be more ben-
eficial to the person living it than the other life. if the correct answer is no, then defi-
nitely the candidate good in question is not an element of well-being. on the other 
hand, if the correct answer is instead that the life with more of the candidate good is 
more beneficial, then we inquire what is the right explanation of this life’s being more 
beneficial. one possible explanation is that the candidate good in question really is 
an element of well-being.
PlEasurE
Here is an illustrative example. We imagine two possible lives for someone that 
are as much alike as possible except that one of these lives contains a larger amount 
of innocent pleasure than the other. We are trying to hold everything equal as much 
as possible with the single variable being the amount of innocent pleasure in the two 
possible lives. We then think about whether the life containing the larger amount of 
innocent pleasure would be more beneficial to the person living it than would be the 
as similar as possible life with a smaller amount of innocent pleasure. if the correct 
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answer is that the life containing the larger amount of innocent pleasure would not 
be more beneficial to the person living it than would be the as similar as possible life 
with a smaller amount of innocent pleasure, then innocent pleasure is not an element 
of well-being. on the other hand, if the correct answer is that the life with a larger 
amount of innocent pleasure is more beneficial, then we need to inquire what is the 
right explanation of this life’s being more beneficial. The explanation that suggests 
itself is that innocent pleasure is indeed an element of well-being.
for that possible explanation to be correct, rival possible explanations must be 
mistaken. Perhaps the leading rival possible explanation is that, although by hypoth-
esis the two lives being compared are as much alike as possible with the exception 
that one includes a larger amount of innocent pleasure than the other, the fact that 
one of these possible lives contains a larger amount of innocent pleasure brings with 
it differences in the levels of other goods and these differences are what account for 
the superiority of one possible life to the other. in short, although our thought ex-
periment was supposed to isolate one variable, the rival possible explanation claims 
that other variables are not only ineliminable but also pivotal.
Here is an example of such a rival explanation. This explanation begins with the 
proposal that the life with the larger amount of innocent pleasure must also have con-
tained a larger amount of significant achievement or friendship or important knowl-
edge or autonomy, as sources of the extra innocent pleasure. This rival explanation 
then adds that what makes the life with the larger amount of innocent pleasure more 
beneficial to the person who lives it than the life with a smaller amount of innocent 
pleasure is not the extra innocent pleasure but instead the larger amount of signifi-
cant achievement or friendship or important knowledge or autonomy.
This rival explanation starts from a false supposition—namely, that the life with 
the larger amount of innocent pleasure must also have contained a larger amount 
of significant achievement or friendship or important knowledge or autonomy, as 
sources of the extra innocent pleasure. This supposition is false because the extra 
pleasure might have come from insignificant achievement or unimportant knowl-
edge or false beliefs or the satisfaction of physiological urges. The source of innocent 
pleasure can be trivial or misconceived or merely physiological. There is no necessity 
that source of innocent pleasure is itself something valuable, much less an element 
of well-being.
We can conclude, then, that innocent pleasure is definitely an element of well-
being. This is the best explanation of why a life containing a larger amount of in-
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nocent pleasure would be more beneficial to the person living it than another pos-
sible life as much as possible like the first one except that this life contains a smaller 
amount of innocent pleasure.
i am aware that, to many people, the thesis that innocent pleasure is an element 
of well-being seems completely obvious. However, there are some people who do 
not find innocent pleasure obviously valuable. my argument above is aimed at these 
people. later in this essay, there is an argument aimed at people who think innocent 
pleasure is valuable only if obtained in the course of a worthwhile activity.
siGnificanT acHiEvEmEnT
The structure of the argument above can be applied to other candidate elements 
of well-being. let us apply it to significant achievement. We imagine two possible 
lives for someone that are as much alike as possible except that one of these lives 
contains a larger amount of significant achievement than the other. We are trying to 
hold everything equal as much as possible with the single variable being the amount 
of significant achievement in the two possible lives. We then think about whether the 
life containing the larger amount of significant achievement would be more benefi-
cial to the person living it than the life that contains a smaller amount of significant 
achievement but is otherwise as similar as possible. if the correct answer is no, then 
significant achievement is not an element of well-being. However, the correct answer 
seems to me to be that the life with a larger amount of significant achievement is 
more beneficial to the person who leads that life than the life that contains a smaller 
amount of significant achievement but is otherwise as similar as possible.
 now, what is the best explanation of this life’s being more beneficial? one pos-
sible explanation is that significant achievement is indeed an element of well-being. 
The rival possible explanation starts from the supposition that the life with the larger 
amount of significant achievement must also have contained a larger amount of in-
nocent pleasure or friendship or important knowledge or autonomy. from this sup-
position, the rival explanation infers that what makes the life with the larger amount 
of significant achievement more beneficial to the person who lives it is not the extra 
significant achievement but instead the larger amount of pleasure or friendship or 
important knowledge or autonomy.
lives containing a larger amount of significant achievements often do also have 
more pleasure, friendship, important knowledge, or autonomy in them than they 
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would have had if they had contained a smaller amount of significant achievement. 
But this certainly is not always true. sometimes people sacrifice pleasure, friendship, 
and important knowledge for the sake of pursing significant achievement. indeed, 
obsession about a goal can be instrumental to achieving it but at the same time in con-
flict with obtaining pleasure, alienating to friends and potential friends, and a blinker 
to information not relevant to the goal. for such reasons, there is no necessity that 
a larger amount of significant achievement correlates perfectly with a larger amount 
of pleasure, friendship, or important knowledge. This is especially obvious in cases 
where the person who made a significant achievement never found out about it, and 
thus could not have gained lots of pleasure from knowing about the achievement.
so what is the correct explanation of the fact that the life containing the larger 
amount of significant achievement would be more beneficial to the person living it 
than the life that is as similar as possible except that it contains a smaller amount 
of significant achievement? The correct explanation cannot be that the life with the 
larger amount of significant achievement must also have contained a larger amount of 
innocent pleasure or friendship or important knowledge or autonomy. The correct 
explanation is instead that significant achievement is an element of well-being.
imPorTanT knoWlEdGE
The same kind of argument can be run for concluding that important knowledge 
is an element of well-being. imagine that two lives are as much alike as possible except 
that one of those lives has important knowledge and the other life does not or one life 
contains a considerably larger amount of important knowledge than the other. The 
life containing no or a considerably smaller amount of important knowledge is worse 
for the agent than a life as much as possible like that one except that it contains at 
least some or a considerably larger amount of important knowledge.
again, we have to ask, what is the best explanation of the greater benefit in the 
life with a larger amount of important knowledge? one possible explanation is that 
important knowledge is indeed an element of well-being. The rival possible explana-
tion starts from the supposition that the life with the larger amount of important 
knowledge must also have contained a larger amount of innocent pleasure or more 
friendship or a larger amount of significant achievement or greater autonomy. from 
this supposition, the rival explanation infers that what makes the life with the larger 
amount of important knowledge more beneficial to the person who lives it is not the 
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extra important knowledge but instead the greater pleasure or friendship or signifi-
cant achievement or autonomy.
We should not accept the supposition that the life with the larger amount of im-
portant knowledge must also have contained a larger amount of innocent pleasure or 
friendship or significant achievement or autonomy. sometimes important knowledge 
reduces rather than increases innocent pleasure. sometimes important knowledge 
harms friendships. sometimes important knowledge is not a significant achievement 
because it was not something that was pursued and thus not an achievement at all. 
Hence the life with the larger amount of important knowledge might not also contain 
greater innocent pleasure or friendship or significant achievement or autonomy.
Thus, the best explanation of the fact that a life containing no or a considerably 
smaller amount of important knowledge is worse for the agent than a life as much 
as possible like that one except that it contains a larger amount of important knowl-
edge cannot be that the life with the larger amount of important knowledge must also 
contain greater innocent pleasure or friendship or significant achievement or auton-
omy. The best explanation must instead be that important knowledge is an element 
of well-being.
auTonomy
concerning autonomy, we can try an argument with the same structure as the 
arguments above. We imagine two possible lives for someone as similar as possible 
except that one contains more autonomy and the other less. Then we ask which of 
these two possible lives is more beneficial to the person who lives it. The autonomous 
life seems better. since we have imagined that the two lives are as equal as possible 
in terms of the other elements of well-being, we minimize the extent to which the 
superiority of the more autonomous life can be explained by the instrumental value 
of autonomy.
again, we face the objection that there are multiple, though correlative, vari-
ables here. The objection is that, if one possible life contains greater autonomy than 
another possible life that is otherwise as similar as possible, the possible life with 
greater autonomy in it must also contain greater pleasure or knowledge or friendship 
or achievement than the other life. from this supposition, the objection infers that 
the greater pleasure or knowledge or friendship or achievement, and not the greater 
autonomy, is what makes this life better.
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However, it just is not true that if one possible life contains greater autonomy 
than another life that is otherwise as similar as possible, then the possible life with 
greater autonomy in it must also contain greater pleasure or knowledge or friendship 
or achievement. Greater autonomy might lead to some successes but also, of course, 
to some failures—some missed opportunities for pleasure, some lack of knowledge, 
some ruined friendships, and some unsuccessful projects. so, on balance, greater au-
tonomy might not lead to greater pleasure or knowledge or friendship or achieve-
ment. so there is nothing to prevent our imagining two possible lives that are equal in 
terms of pleasure, friendship, achievement, and knowledge and yet one of these lives 
contains more autonomy than the other.
We thus ask which of these two possible lives is more beneficial to the person 
who lives it. The more autonomous life seems better. since we have imagined that 
the two lives are as equal as possible in terms of the other elements of well-being, the 
best explanation of the superiority of the more autonomous life in this comparison is 
that autonomy is an element of well-being.
aPPrEciaTinG BEauTy
Experiencing something as beautiful can definitely be instrumental to other 
benefits. most obviously, experiencing something as beautiful can produce pleasure, 
even ecstasy. Experiencing something as beautiful can also lead to other goods, such 
as love and knowledge. But is experiencing something as beautiful a non-instrumen-
tal good such that a life containing such appreciation must be pro tanto better than 
a life without?
Well, are judgements of beauty like judgements of taste, i.e., merely subjective? 
Whether a food is delicious or not is merely subjective. for example, if you judge 
pears to be delicious and i do not, neither of us need be mistaken. if beauty is like 
deliciousness, then while you can be correct about whether you find something’s aes-
thetic qualities attractive, you cannot be correct about whether these qualities really 
are attractive or about whether they ought to attract. if beauty is like deliciousness, 
then what would make a possible life in which you find more beauty better for you 
than a possible life in which you find less beauty would be the additional pleasure or 
friendship that the extra beauty would bring you. if beauty is like deliciousness, then 
appreciating beauty is not itself an element of well-being.
if beauty is not like deliciousness but is instead an objective value, then you can 
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be correct not merely about whether certain qualities attract you and others but also 
about whether certain qualities really are attractive or about whether they ought to 
attract. in that case, you can have knowledge of aesthetic properties. if this is correct, 
perhaps we should classify appreciation of beauty as a kind of important knowledge. 
if appreciation of beauty is a kind of important knowledge, then we have grounds for 
holding that appreciation of beauty is an element of well-being—under the heading 
of important knowledge.
livinG a morally Good lifE
let us now turn to the question of whether living a morally good life is an element 
of well-being. Even if it is not, living a morally good life is of course morally good. and 
living a morally good life might be what there is strongest reason to do even where 
living a morally good life involves self-sacrifice. We can be interested in the question 
of whether living a morally good life is an element of well-being even if we are com-
mitted to sacrificing our own good either for the sake of benefiting others or because 
moral restrictions get in the way of doing what is most beneficial to oneself.
living a morally good life is rewarding in terms of the other elements of well-be-
ing. living a morally good life definitely constitutes a significant achievement.2 and 
living a morally good life can bring pleasure and ferment friendship. and knowing 
what morality requires is important knowledge. But is living a morally good life in 
itself—not under the heading of achievement, or as an instrument to pleasure or 
friendship, or in its connection with knowledge—an element of well-being?
This is not a question to which the answer seems to me directly apparent. The 
best i can do is approach the question indirectly, via what i call the sympathy test (i 
first proposed this test in Hooker, 1996, pp. 149–53).
suppose we ask ourselves whether we are inclined to feel sympathy for someone 
whose life lacks a particular property. sympathy is a judgement-sensitive attitude (on 
judgement-sensitive attitudes, see scanlon, 1998, pp. 20-22). our having sympathy 
for someone whose life lacks a particular property makes sense only if we judge that 
a life’s lacking that property makes the life less beneficial to the person whose life it 
is than would be a life as similar as possible except that it has this property. so if we 
2. an anonymous reviewer suggested that living a morally good life might not be much of an 
achievement if the agent were surrounded by people who always provided incentives for acting mor-
ally. That such incentives are always provided seems to me unrealistic.
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do feel sympathy for someone whose life lacks the property, this attitude makes sense 
only if deep down we think that a life’s having that property is an element of well-
being. and if we do not feel sympathy for someone whose life lacks the property, one 
possible explanation is that deep down we think that a life’s having that property is 
not an element of well-being.
We do feel sympathy for people whose lives lack pleasure, friendships, autono-
my, significant achievement, or important knowledge without some sort of compen-
sation in terms of a greater amount of one or more of these other goods. in contrast, 
we do not feel sympathy for people who fail to live morally good lives. one possible 
explanation of the absence of sympathy is that deep down we really do not believe 
that living a morally good life is an element of well-being.
is the sympathy test a good one? if we do have sympathy for someone, we can le-
gitimately make inferences about our beliefs. To be more specific, if we do feel sympa-
thy for someone whose life lacks a particular property, then we must think that a life’s 
lacking this property makes the life less beneficial to the person whose life it is than 
would be a life as similar as possible except that it has this property. The limitation 
of the sympathy test appears in cases where we do not feel sympathy for someone 
whose life lacks a particular property. yes, one possible explanation for our lack of 
sympathy is that we really think that a life’s having that property is not an element of 
well-being. However, another possible explanation is that something else prevents us 
from feeling sympathy. for example, we might think that the person under consider-
ation deserves a life with lower well-being.
We might initially suspect that feeling sympathy for someone is difficult to 
combine with the condemnation and blame and indignation that we feel towards 
those we believe have failed to lead morally good lives. moral blame is regularly ac-
companied by a kind of hostility, which can get in the way of sympathy.
and yet, blaming someone does not necessarily get in the way of feeling sympa-
thy for that person. sometimes we have to blame someone about whom we care very 
strongly. When we blame someone about whom we care very strongly, the blame can 
be accompanied by sympathy. for example, we might blame ourselves for something 
but at the same time feel sorry for the harm we have caused to ourselves.3
so far in this argument i have assumed that we do not feel sympathy for people 
who fail to live morally good lives. i have cast suspicion on the attempt to explain this 
lack of sympathy as an effect of blame for those who fail to live morally good lives. 
3. i am grateful to Penelope mackie for pointing this out to me.
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Blame for people who fail to live morally good lives does not always prevent sympa-
thy for them. so i tentatively surmise that the best explanation of our lack of sympathy 
for people who fail to lead morally good lives is that we do not really think that living 
such a life is a distinct element of well-being. (This conclusion should be tempered by 
the recognition that living a morally good life can be instrumentally beneficial to the 
person who lives it and can constitute a significant achievement.)
for WEll-BEinG, friEndsHiP is morE 
THan a kind of acHiEvEmEnT
Earlier, i argued that friendship should be listed as a distinct element of well-
being. i have just now appealed to the sympathy test to argue that we do not really 
believe that living a morally good life is a distinct element of well-being, though living 
a morally good life is a kind of significant achievement, which is an element of well-
being. With that conclusion in mind, someone might appeal to the fact that forming 
and sustaining friendships is also an important kind of achievement, albeit one less 
multi-dimensional than living a morally good life.
i do not see how it could plausibly be denied that that forming and sustaining 
friendships is also an important kind of achievement. Here is an example. imagine 
someone named frieda who has found the good in a friend named markus and for-
given him and sustained her interest in him for decades. This really is an impressive 
achievement on her part, given how conflicted and moody and self-deluded and in-
termittently self-destructive markus is. (in contrast, that he has continued to love 
her is no achievement on his part, given how breathtakingly easy she is to admire and 
appreciate.)
now consider the following argument:
Premise 1: Forming and sustaining friendships is like living a morally good life in 
being an important kind of achievement.
Premise 2: Living a moral life is not a distinct element of well-being.
Premise 3: If forming and sustaining friendships is like living a morally good life 
in being an important kind of achievement, and if living a morally good life is not 
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a distinct element of well-being, then forming and sustaining friendships is not a 
distinct element of well-being.
Conclusion: Forming and sustaining friendships is not a distinct element of 
well-being.
since this argument’s conclusion does follow from the premises, we should 
assess the premises. Premise 1 is clearly true. Premise 2 is the conclusion we reached 
via application of the sympathy test, and so let us accept this premise. Premise 3 pre-
sumes that different things that are alike in one relevant respect are also alike in other 
relevant respects. We should not accept this premise, since different things are some-
times not alike in more than one relevant respect. rejecting premise 3, we must reject 
the above argument as unsound.
To show that an argument is unsound is not to show that its conclusion is false. 
in the case of the above argument, however, i think there is an argument showing that 
its conclusion is false. in other words, this is an argument to show that forming and 
sustaining friendships is in fact a distinct element of well-being.
This argument begins with the premise that there is diminishing marginal 
benefit in each element of well-being (this argument was inspired by Hurka, 1993, pp. 
84-96; 2011, pp. 166–74). for example, a life with no achievement but a lot of pleasure 
would benefit a great deal from gaining a significant achievement. let us dub this 
achievement a of size s. compare a very different life, one with lots of achievement 
already. This second life would not benefit as much from gaining the same achieve-
ment a of the same size s. in other words, the two lives we are comparing each gain 
an achievement a of size s; but, in the life where this is the only significant achieve-
ment, achievement a of size s constitutes a large benefit, and, in the life where there 
were already lots of other achievements, achievement a of size s constitutes a smaller 
benefit.
The diminishing marginal benefit to a life of its containing more instances of a 
kind of value of which it already contains a lot is relevant for the following reason. 
imagine a life that already contained a lot of achievement but as yet no friendship. 
suppose now this life gains one friendship. if friendship were not a distinct element 
of well-being but instead merely a subcategory of achievement, then a life that already 
contained a lot of achievement but as yet no friendship would not benefit much from 
the addition of one friendship. However, a life that already had a lot of achievement 
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but as yet no friendship would benefit hugely from the addition of one friendship. 
so friendship is not merely a subcategory of achievement but instead is a distinct 
element of well-being.
sEParaBlE-ElEmEnT—vs—comBinEd-ElEmEnT THEoriEs
let us turn from the question on what is on the list of elements of well-being to 
the question of whether the elements must be combined or need not be combined. 
We can agree that the very best life is one containing all the elements listed—pleasure, 
knowledge of important matters, friendship, significant achievement, and autono-
my. now we can distinguish between two kinds of objective list theory. These two 
kinds disagree about whether each of knowledge of important matters or friendship 
or significant achievement or autonomy on its own constitutes a benefit. combined-
Element Theories hold that only in combination do the listed items constitute ben-
efits. separable-Element Theories hold that the listed elements constitute benefits 
to the agent even when the agent does not have the other items. for example, on the 
separable-Element Theory, knowledge of important matters (or significant achieve-
ment) constitutes a benefit to the agent even if it produces no pleasure for the agent.
joseph raz offers a particularly influential version of the combined-Element 
view. raz champions the partly objectivist view that well-being consists in the suc-
cessful pursuit of worthwhile goals—in a slogan, ‘subjective engagement with objec-
tive value’.
raz’s theory is partly objectivist because which goals are worthwhile is an ob-
jective evaluative question about values. ‘[G]oals are supported by approving judge-
ment. … [o]ne must regard one’s goals in a way which ascribes to them desirability 
characteristics.’ (raz, 1986, p. 300) People ‘engage in what they do because they believe 
it to be a valuable, worthwhile activity. … To the extent that their valuation is mis-
guided it affects the success of their life.’ (raz, 1986, p. 299) ‘[a] person’s belief that 
his goal is valuable does not make it so.’ (raz, 1986, p. 344) People can think they are 
pursuing goals with desirability characteristics and yet be mistaken. People can un-
knowingly pursue valueless goals. and people who are successful in pursuing value-
less goals do not thereby add to their well-being, according to raz.
raz’s theory is not wholly objectivist. facts about the individual subject’s inten-
tions and psychological engagement matter crucially. in raz’s view, someone would 
Journal of Practical Ethics
 BRAD HOOKER30
fail to benefit from having good things in her life like knowledge and friendship if she 
did not have the right intentions and attitudes towards these things.
i agree with raz that the kind of life that is best for any agent is one full of the 
successful pursuit of valuable goals. furthermore, his ranking of active over passive 
states seems right. However, in contrast with raz, i contend that pleasure can add 
to an agent’s well-being even if this pleasure is not associated with the successful 
pursuit of worthwhile goals.
suppose ajay has a life with a given amount of successful pursuit of worthwhile 
goals. (for the purposes of my argument, it doesn’t matter whether this amount is 
high, or low.) now suppose that ajay is given an increment of passive pleasure, not 
pleasure from the pursuit of worthwhile goals. maybe he is introduced to a drink he 
can savour each night right before bed. or perhaps he is blessed with particularly plea-
surable dreams each night. in either case, hasn’t his well-being increased, admittedly 
only a little, but still increased? i propose that, of any two individuals with equally 
successful pursuit of equally worthwhile goals, the one whose life contained more 
pleasure, even if this pleasure is only of a passive kind, has had greater well-being.
raz anticipated this objection (1995, p. 7):
Not all pleasures contribute to one’s well-being. … I stretch myself on the beach and 
enjoy the warmth of the sun; I see a pretty rose, and enjoy the sight. My life is not 
better or more successful as a result. It is different if I am a beach bum, or … a flower 
lover. But in that case the passive pleasure fits in with my activities, I am the sort 
of person who will make sure that there is room in his life for these pleasures. In 
that case the occasional pleasure contributes (if it does) to my well-being because it 
contributes (a tiny bit) towards the success of activities I am set upon. If I have no 
interest in sun on the beach or in flowers, these pleasures, while being real enough 
and while valuable as pleasures, do not contribute to my well-being. They have no 
bearing on my life as a whole. … [T]he pleasure has a meaning in the life of the 
flower lover which differs from its meaning in the life of the one who is not. That dif-
ference makes it reasonable to regard the pleasure as active in one case and passive 
in the other. It is active where it meshes with one’s general orientation in life.
of course i agree that pleasures matter more to some people than they do to 
others. and i agree that the pleasure of looking at a flower differs in meaning depend-
ing on whether that pleasure meshes with one’s projects. But agreeing with raz about 
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those matters does not preclude thinking that passive pleasures do add to well-being, 
even if less than active pleasures. Examples such as the one about ajay suggest that 
passive pleasures do add to well-being. (That said, perhaps passive pleasures of the 
kind raz is discounting are lexically inferior to goods of other kinds. What i mean is 
that no amount of these passive pleasures is large enough to be worth choosing over 
a significant amount of those other goods. for discussion, see crisp, 1996, pp. 23–42.) 
Hence, i am willing to be a bit more subjectivist than raz.
i am also willing to be a bit more objectivist than raz. suppose someone stum-
bles upon some important wisdom or ‘falls into’ a rewarding relationship. Even if 
obtaining important wisdom and having rewarding relationships were not this per-
son’s goals, do not the wisdom and the relationship this person obtains add to her 
well-being? suppose now that she does not appreciate the value of that wisdom or 
relationship until very late in life. That the value was not appreciated earlier is sad. 
But when finally it is appreciated, the thought that our agent might have would be 
‘here has been this good in my life all along and i didn’t realize it. Because of this good 
in my life, i was better off than i thought.’
such thoughts are possibly correct. and when they are correct, their correctness 
does not depend on the agent’s having them. Put crudely, it could be a true propo-
sition that, because of a great unappreciated good pervading the person’s life, this 
person had been better off than she realized. The truth of this proposition does not 
depend on the person’s ever coming to believe the proposition. in other words, if the 
person dies without having ever even considered the proposition, the proposition 
might nevertheless be true. But if this proposition is true, then an agent’s subjec-
tive appreciation of a good is not a necessary condition of that good’s adding to her 
well-being.
raz himself denies what he calls the ‘transparency of intrinsic value’, that is the 
thesis that ‘a feature is intrinsically good only if, under normal conditions, the person 
(or other animal) for whom it is a good is content with its presence and prefers it to 
its absence’. (raz, 1986, p. 269; cf. pp. 268, 321) i too deny the transparency of intrinsic 
value. Because i deny this transparency, i can hold that a person’s well-being was 
greater because of some wisdom she happened upon or a relationship she fell into, 
although, throughout the time her life contained these elements, she was not content 
with their presence and did prefer their absence.
again, raz anticipated the idea. He wrote (1995, p. 6),
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The condition of whole-hearted pursuit presupposes that even where the activity, 
commitment, or relationship is not one which the agent chose, or could abandon by 
choice, he is in control of the manner of his engagement in it. He has to direct his 
conduct in the light of his objectives and commitments, to guide himself towards his 
goal. … In the main, the notions involved … exclude resentment, pathological self-
doubt, lack of self-esteem, self-hate, etc. One is acting whole-heartedly if one is not 
prey to one of these attitudes. Nothing else is required: no reflective endorsement of 
one’s activity, no second-order desire to continue with it, etc. … The fact that certain 
alternatives never cross one’s mind may be a condition of having an appropriate 
attitude to people or activities.
The concession raz makes here is compelling. in order for an activity to benefit 
the person who engages in it, it is not necessary for the person to reflectively endorse 
the activity or to have a second-order desire to desire it. Where the agent’s activity 
or relationship or other good is something he does not reject or resent, his successful 
engagement with it adds to his well-being.
nevertheless, raz’s concession does not, i think, go far enough. His ‘condition of 
whole-hearted pursuit’ restricts the activities and relationships that constitute ben-
efits to an agent to those activities and relationships that the agent does not doubt, 
reject, or resent. However, an agent’s activity or relationship or some other good in 
his life could be something that he actively rejects or resents and yet this activity or 
relationship or some other good in his life could still constitute an addition to his 
well-being. of course, the upset he experiences is a loss for him. But the loss should 
not blind us to the possible associated gain.
for illustration, imagine an agent who has a relationship that she did not choose 
but came to resent, and this resentment went on for years. But then finally she came 
to see that in fact this relationship was a blessing she hadn’t recognized. Though not 
chosen, and long resented, this relationship, she discovers, turns out to be one of 
the most significant things in her life. Perhaps it turns out to be the only significant 
relationship in her life, maybe even the only significant good in her life. neither the 
fact that she didn’t choose the relationship nor the fact that she resented it for years 
precludes the relationship’s constituting an important addition to her well-being.
again, this is a truth that the agent might come to see. Then again, the agent 
might not be so fortunate as to come to see it. The agent’s recognition of the truth 
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would be very good. However, this recognition isn’t a necessary condition of the 
truth’s obtaining.
i have contended that the limits of well-being extend farther both in a subjectiv-
ist direction and in an objectivist direction than raz allows. i have argued that passive 
sensations (a subjective element) can be sufficient on their own to constitute at least 
a little well-being. i have also argued that objective goods such as knowledge and re-
lationships, even if not chosen and even if resented, can on their own constitute an 
addition to well-being, though the distress they cause also constitutes a subtraction 
from well-being. Whether the addition is greater than the subtraction depends on 
the importance of the knowledge, the nature of the relationship, and the amount of 
distress. Perhaps it also depends on how much other knowledge the person has, and 
on how many other relationships her life contains.
To reiterate, the greatest well-being is constituted by whole-hearted, successful 
pursuit of worthwhile goals. What raz has described—the combination of subjec-
tive and objective elements—is the ideal. But the separate elements constitute some 
benefit even when not combined with the others.
THE imPorTancE of THE concEPT of WEll-BEinG
once we analyze well-being into its elements, we encounter a challenge to the 
importance of the concept of well-being. The challenge is that, since anything impor-
tant to say about well-being could be reduced to assertions about these elements, we 
can jettison the concept of well-being. 4 The challenge is to explain why the concept 
of well-being is not at best otiose. i will argue that it is not otiose.
let us distinguish between intrapersonal trade-offs and interpersonal ones. 
in an intrapersonal trade-off, a loss in terms of a person’s well-being occurs for the 
sake of a greater gain in terms of that same person’s well-being. in an interpersonal 
trade-off, a loss in terms of one person’s well-being occurs for the sake of a benefit to 
someone else.
in both intrapersonal cases and interpersonal trade-offs, there is difference 
between cases where gains and losses being traded off are in terms of a single element 
of well-being and cases where the gains and losses being traded off involve multiple el-
ements of well-being. an example of an intrapersonal case involving a single element 
4. This challenge was put to me at a conference on Happiness and Well-Being in oxford in june 
2013.
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is my agreeing to take on some pain now for the sake of my having much less pain 
in the future than i would have if i did not take on the pain now. an example of an 
interpersonal case involving multiple elements is my taking some pain now for the 
sake of protecting your autonomy or your pursuit of significant achievements or your 
knowledge or your friendships.
in thinking about gains and losses involving multiple elements, we rightly find 
thinking in terms of well-being irresistible. The reason for this is, again, that signifi-
cant achievement, important knowledge, friendship, autonomy, and pleasure have 
diminishing marginal value within a life.
imagine that you could give your niece enough money for a very pleasant week 
at the beach. alternatively, you could give your nephew enough money to enable him 
to delay for a week going back to his paid employment, and this week of free time 
would enable him to complete his musical score. should you just weigh the amount 
of pleasure your niece would get against the magnitude of the achievement consti-
tuted by your nephew’s completed score?
no, you should instead think about the size of the benefit your niece would get 
out of that quantity of pleasure and the size of the benefit your nephew would get out 
of his artistic achievement. and the sizes of the benefits to the different people of the 
pleasure and achievement would depend upon how much other pleasure your niece’s 
life contains or how much other achievement is in your nephew’s life. What matters 
really are the sizes of the benefits, not purely the quantities of pleasure and significant 
achievement taken on their own. in other words, what matters is the size of the addi-
tions to each’s well-being, not the quantities of the elements added to each.
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